Perhaps the most striking finding is that no jurisdiction reviewed has created a bespoke regulatory classification for MGAs. In every case, MGAs must shoehorn themselves into existing intermediary categories which weren’t designed for the MGA model, typically MGAs are regulated as (tied) insurance agents or insurance brokers.
The consequences of this regulatory taxonomy gap aren’t merely academic.
In France, for example, most MGAs choose to register as brokers. But brokers are defined under French law as acting in the interest of policyholders, whereas an MGA’s raison d’être is to act as agent for the insurer. The reason for this is pragmatic: the French insurance agent regime carries a burdensome termination indemnity, making the broker route commercially preferable even if conceptually awkward.
In the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) the broker model is similarly favored, not for indemnity reasons, but because the agent classification restricts intermediaries from distributing competing products from multiple insurers, a limitation fundamentally incompatible with the multi-insurer MGA model.
These are just examples of a global patchwork in which the same commercial activity of underwriting and binding risks on behalf of one or more insurers is variously classified as agency, brokerage, “mandated underwriting” (Belgium), “underwriting agency” (Spain), or “authorized agent” (the Netherlands), each carrying its own regulatory incidents and obligations. One might say that the MGA is a regulatory platypus: everybody can see what it is, but nobody quite knows where to put it.
Allocation of responsibility between insurer and MGA is perhaps the most consequential issue. Across all jurisdictions reviewed, the insurer retains primary responsibility for the activities carried out by or through its MGAs, including product oversight, governance, and regulatory compliance.
Delegation of authority is a matter of contract, but regulators are increasingly scrutinizing the substance and effectiveness of insurer oversight. In Ireland, the Central Bank considers MGA applications closely, having identified concerns about how the EU Solvency II regime’s outsourcing requirements operate in practice where MGAs are appointed. In Hong Kong, material outsourcing arrangements must be notified to the Insurance Authority. In Germany, BaFin exercises indirect oversight of MGAs through its supervision of insurers’ outsourcing arrangements.
The UK and EU product governance frameworks derived from the Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) illustrate the nuance at play: an MGA’s obligations differ materially depending on whether it acts as a "manufacturer" (involved in product design and development) or a mere "distributor". Manufacturers face more stringent requirements, including target market identification, distribution strategy monitoring, and fair value assessment. But the IDD framework has been implemented very differently in different European countries – there are many examples – to take one, iRomania, an MGA authorized as an insurance agent cannot act as manufacturer or co-manufacturer at all, and is confined to the distributor role.
Controller and ownership transparency requirements are a near-universal feature of MGA regulation, though the thresholds and mechanisms vary. Most EEA jurisdictions require disclosure of shareholders or members holding 10% or more of capital or voting rights, together with information on close links, at the point of authorization and upon subsequent changes. In the UK, the threshold is set at 20%, with controllers subject to a fit-and-proper assessment that can take as long as four to six months. In Hong Kong, the threshold is 15%.
Importantly, full prior approval of controllers is the exception rather than the rule. More commonly, regulators reserve the right to refuse or revoke authorization if ownership structures would impede effective supervision. In Belgium, where prior approval isn’t formally required, MGAs routinely seek an informal nihil obstat from the FSMA before completing a change of control, to obtain practical certainty.
Foreign ownership restrictions are generally limited. Most EEA jurisdictions defer to the EU’s FDI screening regulations, and most non-EEA jurisdictions impose few insurance-specific barriers. Notable exceptions include Thailand, where foreign persons, including entities with 50% or more foreign shareholding, face significant restrictions on operating restricted businesses, and the DIFC and ADGM, which by contrast permit 100% foreign ownership.
More information
The above conclusions were drawn from the country-by-country review referred to above. More detailed jurisdiction specific information is available here.
This guide reflects our understanding of the law and market practice in each jurisdiction as at July 2026. Regulation in this area continues to evolve and individual jurisdictions may have introduced changes since publication. For advice on a specific jurisdiction, please contact that jurisdiction's key contact, or your usual DLA Piper adviser.